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Abstract 
A model is presented where economic growth is co-determined with the number of 
entrepreneurial firms as functions of union wage bargaining power and of inter-firm 
labour mobility.  There is an inverse-U relationship between economic growth and the 
number of firms, if they are both heterogeneous and operate under decreasing returns 
to scale.  If labour is immobile, economic growth is greatest where unions have a 
moderate degree of wage bargaining power, because this deters less able 
entrepreneurs from setting-up firms without discouraging too many of the more able 
ones.  However, if labour is highly mobile, economic growth is greatest where union 
wage bargaining power is very weak - although not necessarily greater than in the 
immobility case - because the anticipation that workers can switch from lower to 
higher ability/wage firms acts as a very powerful entry deterrent for all but the highest 
ability entrepreneurs.  Between these extremes, the model points to two empirical 
findings,  a the positive correlation between the wage and firm-size, and, for some 
parameter values, a negative cross-country relationship between economic growth and 
income inequality, because countries with more labour mobility should have less 
wage inequality as well as greater allocative efficiency.   
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1.   Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of labour union wage 
bargaining power on macroeconomic activity through its effect on firm formation.   
The number of firms in an economy becomes an important consideration, once they 
are acknowledged either as being heterogeneous or as operating outside constant 
returns to scale, both of which are here assumed.   If firms differ in productivity, but 
commonly have constant returns to scale production functions, aggregate output will 
be highest with the fewest and most productive firms present.  Conversely, if firms are 
symmetric, but subject to decreasing returns, aggregate output will be increasing in 
their number.  So if firms are both heterogeneous and subject to decreasing returns, 
there may be an inverted U-shaped relationship between their number and aggregate 
output, which would peak at an interior value.  The position of an economy on this 
inverted-U curve will depend, not least, on the degree of union bargaining power, as a 
key variable governing the entry of firms.    
 
If the economic growth rate, as well as the number of firms, is also endogenous, 
following an investment externality, according to Romer (1986) or Lucas (1988), the 
accumulative effects of their number on trend output will, over the course of time, 
come to dominate any business cycles effects.   Thus, we focus on the economic 
growth effect of firm entry, but abstracting from the dynamics aspects of that might 
drive a Schumpeterian process, as considered by Aghion and Howitt (1992).  Nor do 
we consider the effects of entrepreneurship, whether innovative as in Aghion and 
Howitt or imitative as in Schmitz (1989), but merely the number of entrepreneurs as 
being synonymous with the number of firms, where each is owned with a single 
entrepreneur.  One aspect of the analysis is to show how endogenous firm formation 
might alter the comparative statics of the relationship between union wage bargaining 
power and economic growth.  An analysis of corporate taxation with Laffer Curve 
effects would be analogous, especially if aggregate tax revenue should depend on the 
number of firms.    
 
   3
Modelling entry and exit means necessary means eschewing the more usual treatment 
of firms as impersonal, mechanistic entities that merely return factor incomes - wages, 
interest and rents - to their recipients - workers, lenders and landlords.  The inclusion 
of entrepreneurs, as the owners of firms’ organisational structures rather than of 
firms’ capital stocks, suggests they are motivated by a desire to earn entrepreneurial 
profits rather than merely to return residual profits.   In this two-period OLG model, 
entrepreneurs are deemed to be equivalent to other young households, namely, 
workers, to the extent they engage in economic activity and save in the first period of 
their lives.   Each young household decides to be one or the other on the basis of 
weighing up the expected prospective income returns, entrepreneurial profits and 
wages.   Consequently, there are three broad classes of household, young workers, 
young entrepreneurs and old households, the last having previously supplied either a 
labour or an entrepreneurial input.  The intra-generational distribution of income 
between wages and entrepreneurial profits is important for economic growth through 
affecting firm formation, while the inter-generational distribution of income between 
the young and old plays no role in the basic set-up with binding labour contracts.  
 
Firm formation and wage determination are closely knit for several reasons.   First, 
both the incentive for firms to enter and the scope for wage bargaining are predicated 
on the existence of surplus profits, making it difficult to think of one activity without 
the other.  Secondly, payments to labour, in comprising the major part of total 
production costs, are of obvious importance for the employer-employee income 
differentials as the basis for the entry decisions.  Wage pressure from strong labour 
unions should limit the number of firms, and, as this model shows, this may be either 
for good or bad in terms of economic growth.   Furthermore, in a setting of general 
equilibrium, the aggregated effects of decentralized wage bargaining are generally 
known to feedback on the local conditions facing the atomistic firm and labour union 
[Moene, Wallerstein and Hoel (1993)].   
 
Much research has already been devoted to looking at the possible effects of labour 
union wage bargaining on economic activity, which is both too extensive and 
intensive too review here.    Thematically, however, if economic activity ( y ) depends   4
on employment (l ,  0 > ∂ ∂ l y ),
3  and if the essential purpose of labour unions is to 
raise wages (w) above existing competitive or reservation levels, the main union 
effect may be gauged by the sign of the derivative  w l ∂ ∂ .   If, according to a more 
mainstream view, firms exert their right-to-manage, where employment is confined to 
a downward-sloping demand curve,  0 < ∂ ∂ w l , unions are evidently harmful to 
economic activity.
 4  
5 
6  Conversely, in monopsony models with upward-sloping 
labour supply curves,  0 < ∂ ∂ w l , a more positive view of union bargaining power 
may be taken.
 7  8   And, where there is full-employment at a maximum participation 
level (m),  m l = , it follows, trivially, that  0 = ∂ ∂ w y , unless wage bargaining 
elicits some other productivity response.
 9 
10   
 
In addition, as mentioned, there has been increasing attention given to a more recent 
class of dynamic models, initiated by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), containing the 
property of non-decreasing returns in a general measure of the capital stock, so that  
aggregate saving, s , drives long-run economic growth.   In models such as these the 
sign of the derivative  w s ∂ ∂  trumps that of  w l ∂ ∂  for the long-term consequences 
                                                 
3 There are other union effects beyond the scope of this paper that are considered extensively in 
Booth(1995).      
4 A moral hazard problem then arises if governments rather than unions take responsibility for 
providing unemployment insurance by causing the cost of aggressive wage bargaining to be 
externalized.    There is then another, detrimental effect on economic activity throughout the economy, 
if these public unemployment benefits are financed through distortionary taxes. 
5 Generally, apart from the possibility of restrictive  practices discouraging investment by the firm, 
positive cross-productivity effects in the production function mean that the aggressive wage bargaining 
will also reduce the firm’s demand for capital as well as its level of employment.        
6 Layard and Nickell (1990) show that this result extends to the model of McDonald and Solow (1991) 
where firms and unions bargain wages and employment simultaneously, if the reservation wage, which 
determines the position of an efficient contract curve, is indexed to aggregate wages.      
7 A moral hazard problem then arises if governments rather than unions take responsibility for 
providing unemployment insurance by causing the cost of aggressive wage bargaining to be 
externalized.    There is then another, detrimental effect on economic activity throughout the economy, 
if these public unemployment benefits are financed through distortionary taxes. 
8 The consideration of labour market monoposony has been rehabilitated by Manning (2003) in 
emphasizing the role of imperfect information as a basis rather than the traditional view that it rested on 
single city-firms.   Since union bargaining power will then raise employment and output, there are 
further potential general equilibrium benefits as benefit payments and distortionary taxes are reduced.        
9  For example, Booth (1995) suggests that the reduction of X-inefficiency [Leibenstein (1966)] 
provides a possible benefit for union bargaining power.  
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of factors like union bargaining power.  Decomposing aggregate saving, s , into   
y s ≡ σ  and y , wage bargaining effects may work by affecting the average saving 
rate, σ ,  for given aggregate incomes or by altering these,  y , for a given σ .  The 
decomposition implies  
) )( ( ) ( w l l y w y w s ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ≡ ∂ ∂ σ σ .    
 
The first effect constitutes the well known Kaldorian growth effect, which is 
demonstrated most clearly within a full employment context: capital accumulates 
faster, if the income redistribution favours individuals with higher than average saving 
rates [See Kaldor (1957)].   Although in Kaldor, by assumption, “capitalists” save 
proportionally more than “workers”, 
11  the opposite arises as a result in the basic two-
period form of the Diamond (1965) life-cycle model, where “young households” work 
and save, while “old households” own the capital stock and dis-save by running down 
their accumulated assets.
 12    
 
The second effect depends,  w l ∂ ∂ , clearly depends on the same factors relevant in to 
static models but with consequences for rates of change in dynamic models instead of 
levels in static ones.  Since the focus of this present paper is on impact of union 
bargaining power through influencing the number of firms, we choose to isolate this 
particular effect by modelling an economy at full employment, so that  0 = ∂ ∂ w l , 
and also preclude the Kaldorian redistribution effect in its basic form, so that 
0 = ∂ ∂ w σ .    
 
The paper thus isolates an additional route, the entry decision of entrepreneurial firms 
by assuming that, initially, each young household chooses to become either an 
entrepreneur or a worker on the basis of the relative expected incomes, depending on 
                                                 
11  Although this is assumed in this earlier non-optimizing model, it arises as a result under 
optimization within an infinite-horizon version of Romer’s (1986) endogenous growth model in Bertoli 
(1993), provided that labour is regarded strictly as a non-accumulated factor in the sense there is no 
accumulation of human capital.    
and/or sufficiently rising wage-profiles within multi-period models. 
12  Bequest saving by the old modifies this result, as would the admission of financial market 
imperfections and/or of sufficiently rising wage-profiles within multi-period models.   6
known own entrepreneurial ability, determining a personal prospective profit income, 
relative to the expected or actual of all prospective entrepreneurs, out of which wages 
are determined.   Households then engage in the production process when young, 
either as entrepreneurs or workers, and then retire in the second period to live off their 
accumulated asset income. 
 
Entrepreneurs receive a profit income after they have paid both wages to workers, 
their contemporaries, and the interest income to the old.   So, while the feature that 
old households collectively own the economy’s capital stock is maintained, it is 
implicitly assumed that young entrepreneurs as the initiators of firms own them as 
organizational structures.  Entrepreneurial profits are bargained shares of the income 
that remains after payments to capital.  
 
The distinctive feature of the model is that wage bargaining affects the intra- rather 
than the inter-generational distribution of income.   Under full employment increased 
bargaining power would affect aggregate saving if workers and entrepreneurs had 
different saving rates.   As common saving rates are assumed, wage bargaining can 
only influence aggregate saving through interest rates changes affecting the inter-
generational redistribution of income.  In the discussion that follows the main 
analysis, we point that this would occur for a case of non-binding labour contracts, as 
considered by Deveureux and Lockwood (1991).   
 
Behaviour consists of the following sequence of actions.  Initially, young households 
decide whether to become entrepreneurs or workers, and the latter locate to 
entrepreneur/firms and form local labour unions.  On location, workers then come to 
realise the entrepreneurial abilities of their own and of all other employers.   There are 
then two absolute possibilities:  an immobility case where workers are stuck with their 
initial choice of entrepreneur-firm and a mobility case where workers may freely 
move from lower ability to higher ability ones.   For each possibility, there are 
configurations of wages and profits.   Each young household then saves a portion of 
his or her income, and, finally, the saving of all households are aggregated to form the 
economy’s capital stock.   7
 
The main analysis covers two polar and manageable cases.  One is the complete 
immobility case.   Here labour is allocated equally across disparate firms based on the 
initial ignorance of relative entrepreneurial abilities, and a wage distribution follows 
commensurate with these realised abilities.  The main result is that an intermediate 
degree of relative labour union power in wage bargaining is beneficial for economic 
activity and growth, because this is maximized at an interior number of firms because 
of a trade-off between the average ability of firms and decreasing returns to scale.   
For the second polar case of full labour mobility, an arbitraging process leads to firms 
paying the same wage but with the more able ones being able to attract a more than 
proportional supply of workers.  The associated and anticipated feature of a 
corresponding distribution of profits deters all but the most able firms from 
establishing firms.  In these circumstances, even a moderate degree of relative union 
bargaining may be very harmful for economic growth.   
 
There are also two offshoots from the main analysis.   An intermediate case of labour 
mobility would imply that more able entrepreneurs would both pay higher wages and 
employ more workers.  This replicates the robust empirical relationship found that is 
defined as the “employer-size wage effect”.   Secondly, then distributional aspect of 
the model implies there may be a relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth, which is negative where union bargaining power is relatively weak, 
because labour mobility leads both to wage equalization and allocative efficiency.   
 
The set-up of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2 aggregate saving and capital 
accumulation is determined from the last two.   In section 3 deals with the production 
sector, the factor demands and the wage bargain.   The main analysis is considered in 
Sections 4 and 5 that consider the respective cases of no and full labour mobility.  
Section 6 extends the discussion and Section 7 gives a brief summary of the analysis.  
   
 
 
2.  The basic model   8
 
2.1 Households 
Households, indexed h, live for and derive utility from consumption, 
Y
t h c
,  and 
O
t h c
1 , + , in two periods. They have Cobb-Douglas utility functions, 
) 1 (
1 ,
) 1 ( 1
, ,







t h t h c c U ,  h ∀ , where θ ,  1 0 < <θ , is a time-preference 






t h z R c c
, 1 1 , , = + + + ,  h ∀ , where  1 + t R  is a common interest return factor 
accruing  in the second period on first period saving; 
Y
t h z
,  is a first-period, 
heterogeneous income from activity.   All households are retired in the second period 
when they live off previous period savings and do not receive any endowment or 
pension income.  Utility is maximized by the individual household by the choice of 
saving at,   
()
Y
t h t h z s
, , 1 θ θ + = ,  h ∀  
which in aggregate is 
() ∫ + =
1
0
, 1 dh z s
Y
t h t θ θ , where  ∫ ≡
1
0
, dh s s t h t                                         (1) 
Symmetric preferences and the linearity of the saving-income relationship imply that 
aggregate saving is immune from intra-generational income distribution effects,  thus 
precluding a possible Kaldorian effect on economic growth.  The indirect utility of 
each household is solved as  
()
Y





, ) 1 (
θ θ θ θ
+
+
− + =   h ∀                                                                    (2)          
 
With full depreciation of the capital stock within one period and with the same lag 
length for aggregate financial saving,  t s , to transform into physical investment, 
capital accumulation is given by 
()
Y
t t t z s k θ θ + = = + 1 1 , where  ∫ =
1
0




t                              (3)   9
We may skimp on notation by hatting the two future variables,  1 + t k  and 1 + t R , as k ˆ 
and  R ˆ , and by presenting current variables,  t x , without time-subscripts as x.  The 
notation for the economic growth factor is G  where  k k G ˆ ≡ . 
 
2.2 Production   
Output in firm i is given by the following production function   
α β α
i i i i k m Be y
− =
1 ,   β α < ,    1 0 < + < β α ,   for  1 ≥ i m                                 (4) 
It contains two parameters, general total factor productivity,  B, and firm-specific 
entrepreneurial ability,  i e , and two variable inputs, labour,  i m ,  and capital,  i k , each 
of which is now considered in turn.  
 
2.2.1   Total factor productivity 
The common term for total factor productivity,  B, is exogenous to the individual 
firm, but depends on a general learning-by-doing externality, following Arrow 
(1962)) and Romer (1986).   Knowledge is a by-product of private investment,  i k , 
which becomes a public good relating to the aggregate stock of capital, k , 
α − = 1 Ak B  where  ∫ ≡ di k k i                                                                       (5) 
 
2.2.2   Entrepreneurial ability 
The output of each firm also depends on the innate ability,  i e , of its single 
entrepreneur,  i .   The distribution of entrepreneurial abilities is important for the 
general equilibrium, and we assume a uniform distribution, 
( ) σ σ 3 , 3 ~ + − e e U ei .          ( 6 )        
to obtain analytical solutions to the model.  Its supports are presented in terms of the 
and standard deviation, σ  - with the mean of the distribution, e  - in order to focus 
on the dispersion.   The population mean may be negative,  0 < e , which would imply  
that less than half of the population would be able to make a positive profit when   10
playing an entrepreneurial role.   The condition  σ 3 − > e  is necessary to ensure 
that least some of them would be so able to do. 
 
According to equation (6), the person who is ranked ith has the ability level, 
() 1 2 3 ) ( − + = i e i e σ .   Designating λ  as the proportion of firms, a key 
endogenous variable and assuming that the more able are the first to start firms, the 
individual who is indifferent between being an entrepreneur and a worker would have 
the critical level of ability, 
() λ σ λ 2 1 3 ) ( − + = e eC ,                                                                                      (7) 
The uniform nature of the distribution implies that the average ability of all those who 
choose to start firms is  ) 3 ( 2 1 ) ( 2 1 σ λ + + e eC  or  
() ( ) ) 1 ( 3 2 ) 3 ( ) ( λ σ σ λ − + = + + = e e e e E C                              (8)                               
 
2.2.3 Labour 
The whole workforce belongs to a firm-specific unions each with a membership of 
i m , which must be at least as large as employment,  i i l m ≥ .    The assumptions, (i) 
that household utilities are linear in income, (ii) that unions have utilitarian objectives, 
and (iii) that unemployment incomes are zero, together imply that the objective of 
labour unions is to maximize the wage bill.   Since this is decreasing in the wage, 
since the Cobb-Douglas production generates an elastic demand for labour, the union 
and the firm will always concur upon wage reduction wherever  i i m l ≥ .  
Consequently, there will always be bargaining at full employment where  i i m l = .
13   
 
The term  i m  is defined as being exclusive of the single entrepreneur, so that equation 
(4) shows that it takes at least two individuals, one worker plus the single 
entrepreneur in order to produce an output.   Thus, the production function exhibits 
                                                 
13 This technology gives rise to a constant elasticity of labour demand, implying that in the event of 
unemployment the wage would be determined as a multiple of the unemployment utility.  As this is 
assumed to be zero, the result of a zero wage implies that unemployment cannot be a possibility.     11
increasing returns locally where  i m  is small, but decreasing returns ensue where  i m  
is large, because  1 < +α β  and since  i e  is a parameter unrelated to the scale of 
output.
14   
 
2.2.4 Capital 
The analysis considers the case where the firm’s investment decision is simultaneous 
to the wage bargain.   The alternative where wage contracts are not binding, so that 
the union may renegotiate after the capital stock has been installed, following Grout 
(1984), is taken up in the subsequent discussion rather than in the main analysis in the 
interest of brevity.  
   
2.2.5 Entrepreneurial  profit 
Entrepreneurial profit is given by 
i i i i i i i Rk m w k m e Ak − − =
− − α β α α π
1 1                                            (9) 
where i w  is the wage of firm i  and R is the total and common cost of capital, 
comprising the sum of the interest and depreciation rates under the 100% depreciation 
assumption.    
 
2.3     Wage bargaining and investment 
The generalized Nash bargaining solution is applied to determine the wage.  It is well 
known that this may be obtained by maximizing a Nash function, a geometrically 
weighted sum of the two bargaining surpluses, 
() ()
ϖ ϖ π π w
i
w





and, in this case, with respect to the wage.   The weight, ϖ ,  1 0 ≤ ≤ω , represents 
the relative bargaining power of the union, and is the key parameter of the model.    
 
                                                 
14   0 = i y ,  if the firm employs a single household - either where  1 = i m  but with no entrepreneur 
or with one entrepreneur where  0 = i m ; but  that  0
1 > =
− α α
i i i k Be y  if the firms employs two 
households, an entrepreneur and a worker.    12
Equation (2) implies that if the two parties agree, they will each receive a payoff  
linearly related to their income, 
Y
i h i h z U
, , Ω = ,  ( )
) 1 ( 1 ˆ ) 1 (
θ θ
θ θ
+ − + ≡ Ω R , whether a 
wage or a profit income,  i
Y
i h w z =
, ,  i i i i i i Rk m w k m e Ak − −
− − α β α α 1 1 .  In the 
event of disagreement, each party is assumed to receive zero,  0 ˆ =
w
i U ,  0 ˆ =
π
i U .    
The Nash bargaining solutions for the wage and profit on each firm are 
() i i i i
i
i Rk k m e Ak
m
w − =
− − α β α α ϖ 1 1                                                   (10)                                
( ) i i i i i Rk k m e Ak − − =
− − α β α α ϖ π
1 1 ) 1 (                     (11) 
The wage bill and profit are proportional to output net of the costs of capital with the 
proportions given by the bargaining weights, ϖ  and ϖ − 1 . 
 
Simultaneously, the firm determines the profit-maximizing investment level,    
() k e R Am k i i i
α β α
− − =
1 1 1                                                                                (12) 
This equation is the basis for a solution for the interest factor.   First, aggregation 
gives the aggregate or mean investment level across firms as  
( ) ( )k e m E AR k
) 1 ( 1 1 1 α β α
α
− − − = ; 
then, after removing the common factor  and inverting the remaining expression,   
( ) ( )
α α β α
− − =
1 ) 1 ( e m E A R                                                                                       (13) 
is obtained.  Substituting this back into equations (10)-(12) gives  
() ( ) k e m e m E A w i i i
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
α β α α α β α ϖ
− − − − − − − =                                      (14) 
() () k e m e m E A i i i
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
α β α α β α ϖ π












=                                                                                                (16)   13
Applying the aggregate forms of these to equation (3) for capital accumulation gives a 
general expression for the growth factor, 
() () ()
α α β λ α θ θ
− − − + =
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 e m E A G                    (17) 
 
3.   Occupational choice and the allocation of workers to firms   
 
3.1  The time structure of information 
First, irrespective of the time-structure, the standard rational expectations assumption 
is maintained:  individuals know the economic model, including its aggregate 
parameter values and the functional relationship.   Consequently, they know, 
according to equations (14) and (15), that any firm’s wage  i w , is increasing in the 
ability of its entrepreneur,   0 > ∂ ∂ i i e w  , but decreasing in the number of workers it 
employs,  0 < ∂ ∂ i i m w ,  while that the profit of any firm,   i π , is increasing both in 
the level of the ability of its entrepreneur,  0 > ∂ ∂ i i e π  and in the number of its 
workers,  0 > ∂ ∂ i i m π .    
 
However, at an initial stage, individuals have limited information of individual 
parameters, namely, the potential entrepreneurial abilities of other households.   It is 
at this stage that they must choose either to establish firms, becoming employers, or to 
allocate themselves to entrepreneur-firms as employees, where also and collectively 
they will establish local labour unions.   Their knowledge of the distributional 
parameters implies they also know the equilibrium solution in the proportion of 
employers,  λ , and the average ability,  ) (e E , which allows them to correctly 
anticipate the average wage,  ) (w E , but not a specific wage pertaining to any 
particular firm,  h w ,  which pertains to the unknown ability level,  h e , of a particular 
household.   Thus, while they know the actual profit income they themselves would 
receive as a prospective employer, according to the exact form of equation (15), they 
only know the average wage they might receive as an employee based on an 
expectational version of equation (14)      14
() () () ( )k e m E e m E A w E
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
α β α α α β α ϖ
− − − − − − − =                              (18) 
 
3.2   The indifference condition 
The choice of occupation is based on the expected income of being a worker  ) (w E  
relative to that of the known income of being an employer  i π , because of the linearity 
of the income-utility relationship and because of the absence of any other factors 
affecting utility.   An individual will become an entrepreneur if  ) (w E i > π  and a 
worker, if  ) (w E i < π .   An individual indifferent between these two occupations, for 
whom  ) (w E C = π , will have characteristics that satisfy,   
( ) e m E e m C C
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
α β α α β ϖ ϖ
− − − − − = −                    (18) 
This is obtained by setting equations (15) and (18) into equality and by removing the 
common factors. The term  C m  is the number of workers in a firm that is led by an 
entrepreneur who himself is just indifferent to becoming a worker.   The proportion of 
entrepreneur/firms,  λ , may eventually be solved by combining this equation  with  
(7) and (8), but after solving also for the terms,   C m  and  ( ) e m E
) 1 ( ) 1 ( α β α − − − − .     
 
The solutions for these constituent terms depend on the particular mobility 
assumptions of the model, of which there are two polar possibilities.  One is that 
workers (and entrepreneurs) are completely immobile between firms, so that they are 
stuck with their initial allocation and occupation decisions they made based on 
imperfect information.  The other is where workers are completely mobile throughout, 
so that their initial allocation choices are immaterial to the ultimate equilibrium 
solution of the model.  These two will be treated separately in the following two 
Sections.  An intermediate case of imperfect mobility may also be considered but is 
more easily included in the later discussion as a (non-linear) combination of the two 
polar cases under consideration rather than in the main analysis as a separate case.  
 
 
4. With  no  ex post labour mobility    15
 
4.1  The allocation of households to firms and the proportion of firms 
 
In the absence of any degree of ex post labour mobility, the ex ante allocation of 
households to firms, by definition, persists as the ex post allocation.    Then, we 
suggest that the actual allocation will be according to the following result. 
 
Result One:  In the absence of ex post labour mobility, (i) there is an equal allocation 
of workers across firms,  m mi =   i ∀ , with the proportion of entrepreneurs/firms 
at
1 ) 1 (
− + = m λ ; and (ii) a wage distribution with  ) , ( m e w w i i = ,   0 > ∂ ∂ i i e w .    
  Proof:   By definition, the initial allocation persists, based on individuals not 
having prior knowledge of the various abilities levels of prospective employers.   (i)  
We show that m mi =   i ∀ , if there is no reason for the allocation decision other than 
considerations of prospective relative incomes.  Suppose by contradiction 
that q p m m > , the derivative sign,  0 < ∂ ∂ i i m w  then implies households would 
believe that   q p w w ˆ ˆ < , since there is no basis on which they would believe anything 
other than q p w w ˆ ˆ = .  This would cause an arbitraging movement of workers from 
firm q to firm  p  - within the initial allocation process - until beliefs that  q p w w ˆ ˆ =  
emerged whereat  q p m m = .  In addition, if  m mi =   i ∀ , then 
1 ) 1 (
− + = m λ under 
the assumption of a single entrepreneur per firm.  (ii)   Equation (14) then implies that 
wages ex post will be positively (linearly) related to firm specific-abilities.  
 
Thus in the absence of ex post labour mobility, employment is equalized across firms 
but with a wage distribution that reflects the distribution of entrepreneurial abilities.    
 
4.2  The solution with no ex post labour mobility (case A) 
Applying Result One and equations (7) and (8) to equations (13)-(17) and using the 
subscriptA to indicate this particular immobility case, gives     16
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15                (17A) 
 
Note there is generally a non-monotonic relationship between the economic growth 
and the proportion of firms,  A λ , which enters the equation thrice.   Its first 
appearance has an unambiguously negative effect, because the presence of more firms 
spells a lower average ability level with the least able individuals being the last to 
become entrepreneurs.  The remaining two appearances  A λ  in equation (17A) 
indicate the variable scale effect.   Returns are decreasing,  β λ − <1 A , where the  
that the proportion of firms is relatively small or where  the number of workers per 
firm is relatively large,  ) 1 ( β β − < m .    Here, the growth-maximizing proportion 
of firms,  * A λ , may lie within the interior,   β λ − < < 1 * 0 A .    The following result 
gives a more precise statement of the possibilities.  
 
Result 2:   With no ex post labour mobility, economic growth is highest where the 
proportion of firms is  * A λ , where  ( ) 5 . 0 ,
~
min * A A λ λ = ,    
A A A A D C C ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 − − = λ ,
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λA , where an interior solution, 
                                                 
15 Note  i i w π λ + −
− ) 1 (
1
 is the combined income of all young households attached to firm i , and  
π λ + −
− w ) 1 (
1
 for the average firm and  ( ) π λ λ + −
− w ) 1 (
1
 for the economy average with 
λ  firm.    The solutions with equation (2) give  A G .    17
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 for which  5 . 0 > β  is a 
sufficient condition since  1 < α .   
 
If firms are symmetric, so that  0 = σ , then  β λ − =1
~
A , provided  that  5 . 0 > β  and 
then   5 . 0 1
~
* < − = = β λ λ A A .   This is at the point of constant returns to scale.   
Raising the dispersion of ability levels ( 0 > σ ) then introduces a negative effect, 
0 < ∂ ∂ λ A G , on top of this, because the average entrepreneurial ability level is 
lower with a greater number of firms.  Growth is then highest where  β λ − <1 , 
which falls within the region of decreasing returns, where the scale benefit of having 
more firms each employing fewer workers just offsets the reduction in the average 
ability purchased by this increase. 
 
In a model with constant returns to scale, the number of firms would not matter for 
aggregate activity, if they all happened to be identical, so union power in affecting 
λ would be neutral in the present model as it stands.  However, under constant returns 
and for any degree of dispersion in ability, aggregate output would be monotonically 
decreasing in the number of firms and, hence, strictly increasing in the relative degree 
of union wage bargaining power.  In general, however, to recap, restricting the entry 
of firms may raise aggregate activity for two reasons: first, there are positive scale 
effects under increasing returns; and, secondly, average entrepreneurial ability is 
greatest, since the least able individuals are the last set up firms. 
 
Also, applying Result One and equations (7) and (8) to (19) determines the proportion 
of firms, 
A A A A D C C − − =


































λA                                               (19A)   18
Naturally, the proportion of firms is decreasing in the relative union wage bargaining 
power, since  0 < ∂ ∂ ϖ λA .   Also, note that while technically as  1 → ϖ ,   0 → A λ  
and as  0 → ϖ ,  1 → A λ ,  if production requires at least one worker per firm, then 
5 . 0 0 min , = ≤ < A A λ λ  becomes an additional requirement, which places a 
minimum value for  the union bargaining weight at   
( ) 5 . 0 3 4 2 ) (
min ≤ + = σ σ ϖ e e A  as   0 ≥ σ  and  0 ) ( < ∂ ∂ σ σ ϖ
MIN
A .    
 
Finally, we may establish the first main result that concerns the effect of union 
bargaining power by combining equation (19A) with Result Two in the following. 
 
Proposition 1:   In the absence of ex post labour mobility,  provided β  and/or σ  are 
not too small, economic growth is maximized at an intermediate degree of relative 
wage bargaining power,  * A ϖ  , 
min * A A ϖ ϖ > , where (ii)  * A ϖ  and  
min
A ϖ  , where  
  0 * > ∂ ∂ σ ϖ A  and  0
min < ∂ ∂ σ ϖ
A .   
Proof of Proposition 1:  (i) Consider,  0 = σ  and  5 . 0 > β , then Result Two 
implies that 5 . 0 1 ) 0 ( * < − = β λA  and equation (20A) that  5 . 0 ) 0 ( * > = β ϖ A .  
Equation (19A) then gives  5 . 0 ) 0 (
min = A ϖ , so that  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( *
min
A A ϖ ϖ > .   (ii) As 
Result Two and equation (20A) together imply  0 * > ∂ ∂ σ ϖ A  [because 
0 * < ∂ ∂ σ λA  and  0 < ∂ ∂ ϖ λA ]and equation (19A) implies  0
min < ∂ ∂ σ ϖ
A , 
it follows that if  5 . 0 > β ,   ( ) 0 *
min > ∂ − ∂ σ ϖ ϖ A A  and 
min * A A ϖ ϖ > ,  σ ∀ .    
 
We note that where this proposition does not always hold, say, for example, where 
0 = σ  and  5 . 0 < β .   Economic growth is then an increasing function of λ  over its 
relevant range  ) 5 . 0 , 0 ( and so is highest where  5 . 0 )* 0 ( = A λ .   The obverse is that 
growth is a decreasing function of ϖ , union bargaining power, and highest where  
unions are feasibly weakest at the feasible minimum, 
min
A ϖ ϖ = .   The following 
Table furnishes some numerical results for the purpose of illustration.      19
 
Table One: The proportion of firms, economic growth and the growth-
maximizing and maximal levels with no ex post labour mobility  [case (A)] 
   0 = σ ,  μ = e  
ϖ λ − =1 A  
  μ σ = = e 3     0 = e ,  μ σ = 3  
2 ( ) 1 ( ϖ ϖ λ − − = A
 
ϖ     A λ   A G     A λ   A G     A λ   A G  
0.5    0.50   0.500X    0.42     0.702X    0.33          0.381X 
0.7    0.30    0.499X    0.27   0.643X    0.23          0.396X 






  60 . 0 *= A ϖ  
40 . 0 *= A λ  
X GA 51 . 0 *=  
  64 . 0 *= A ϖ  
31 . 0 *= A λ  
X GA 723 . 0 *=
  69 . 0 *= A ϖ  
24 . 0 *= A λ  
X GA 395 . 0 *=  
()
α μ α θ θ
− − + ≡
1 ) 1 ( 1 A X  
 
The proportion of firms is also decreasing in the population dispersion of ability 
levels relative to their mean.  The assigned values imply that economic growth is 
highest where union bargaining power is roughly twice as great as that of employers.  
 
5.  Ex post labour mobility 
 
5.1  The allocation of households to firms and the proportion of firms 
At a later stage, following the initial allocation, all entrepreneurial ability levels 
become known.  There is then an incentive for workers who initially attached 
themselves to lower ability entrepreneurs to relocate to high ability ones, because 
[from equation (14)]  0 > ∂ ∂ i i e w .  There is also an incentive for prospective 
employers to accept them - and for existing employers to be reluctant to lose them - 
because [from equation (15)]  0 > ∂ ∂ i i m π .   The fact that incumbent workers 
would not want to accept later arrivals, because 0 < ∂ ∂ i i m w , is immaterial to this 
mobility case.  Thus, if insider power is the basis for the immobility assumption of the 
previous Section, it is absent by construction in the present one.       20
 
Result Three:  Ex post labour mobility implies (i) a common wage, 
() k e E A w w B B i
1 1 1
) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
− − − −
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e E   and (ii) a distribution of 
employment,   ()
φ
j i j i e e m m =   j i, ∀ ,   where  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > − − − ≡ β α α φ . 
There is now no wage distribution, but, for a given λ , a greater dispersion of 
employment since  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > − − − ≡ β α α φ . 
 
5.1  The bargaining outcome with ex post labour mobility 
Applying Result 2 for full ex post labour mobility instead of Result 1 to equations 
(13)-(17), now indexed with B, to denote full labour mobility, gives the solutions                           
()
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Result Four:   If  0 > σ  , ex post labour mobility leads to a higher growth factor, 
A B G G > , for a given proportion of firms,  B A λ λ λ = = . 
Proof:  Comparing equations (13A-15A) and (17A) with (13B-156B) and 
(17B) shows that all factor returns and growth are higher , A B R R > ,  ) ( A B w E w > , 
) ( ) ( A B E E π π >  and  A B G G > , because of the application of Jensen’s inequality, 
() ) ( ) (
1
e E e E >
φ φ , since   1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > − − − ≡ β α α φ .    
   21
This is an allocative efficiency result.  With the full mobility of labour, for a given 
number of firms, the more able ones are able to obtain a larger number of workers 
than in the previously immobility case, and, with cross-effects in the production 
function, also acquire commensurately more capital.   Wage equality is consistent 
with an unequal distribution of employment across heterogeneous firms.  Cross-
effects in the production function also cause a greater inequality of investment 
productivities across firms, so that the more able will also have a more than 
proportional allocation of capital,  ( )φ
j i j i e e k k = j i, ∀ ,   1 > φ .  For example, if 
employer  j  is more able than employer i  by a factor of 1.2 and if  3 . 0 = α  and 
6 . 0 = β , instead of  j having relatively more of each input by a factor of 1.2,  as in 
the immobility case,  it is now has more by a factor of 3.6.    
     
Result Five:   If  0 > σ , the growth-maximizing proportion of firms is higher under 
ex post labour mobility,  * * A B λ λ > . 
Proof: Equations (17A) and (17B) have a number of common factors, 
including
β λ λ ) 1 (
1 −
− , but are differentiated by the respective terms ()
α − 1 ) (e E  and 
()
β α φ − − 1
) (e E .  As  0 → λ ,  () ( )
α β α φ α − − − − → →
1
max
1 1 ) ( ) ( e e E e E ; but if 
0 > λ ,  () ()
α β α φ α − − − − < <
1
max
1 1 ) ( ) ( e e E e E , it then follows that 
() () 0 ( ) (
1 1 < ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂
− − − λ λ
β α φ α e E e E , so that  λ λ ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ B A G G   and that 
at  0 = ∂ ∂ λ A G  where  * A λ λ =  ,  0 > ∂ ∂ λ B G , so that  * * A B λ λ > .     
 
The intuition for this particular Result is less obvious than that for the previous one, 
but is related.   Under labour immobility, the fact that lower ability firms have the 
same number of workers as higher ability is costly in terms of economic growth.  The 
only way for the more productive firms to obtain more workers is for there to be 
fewer firms in total.   If the more productive firms may obtain more workers by the 
process of labour mobility instead, there is not the same advantage in having less 
firms, so the growth-maximizing proportion of firms rises.   The question remains,   22
however, of the determination of the equilibrium proportion of firms in the full 
mobility case? 
 
5.2  The proportion of firms with ex post labour mobility 
Although economic growth will be higher under labour mobility for a given 
proportion of firms, we now show that the proportion of firms will lower for a given 
bargaining power parameter.  The indifference condition is obtained by setting 
equations (14B) and (15B) for the marginal firm into equality.  After removing the  
common factors,   ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 φ φ ϖ λ ϖ e E e B C = − −
− ,  which, according to the 
distributional assumption underlying equations (7) and (8) gives,   
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Result Six:   If there is full ex post labour mobility, the proportion of firms is 
lower, A B λ λ < , for any given degree of union relative bargaining power, 
B A ϖ ϖ ϖ = = .  
  Proof :  Using the definition 
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Consider the central term  ( ) ) 1 ( ln ) 1 (
1 1 − − + ≡
+ + φ φ φ x x x z .   We show that 
0 ≤ ∂ ∂ φ F  as   0 ≥ λ .  First, as  0 → λ ,  1 → x  ,  0 → z , whereat  0 → ∂ ∂ φ F .   
Second, because  0 > ∂ ∂ λ x  and  x x x z ln ) 1 (
2 φ φ + = ∂ ∂ , if   0 > λ  so that  1 > x ,  
0 ln ) 1 (
2 > + = ∂ ∂ x x x z
φ φ ,  0 > z  and  0 < ∂ ∂ φ F .   Then it is apparent by 
inspection that  0 < ∂ ∂ λ F , so that  0 < ∂ ∂ φ λ .   23
 
The intuition happens to be more obvious than the proof.  Under labour mobility, 
prospective entrepreneurs of a lower ability anticipate they would subsequently lose 
workers to higher ability ones, which implies a cost in terms of lower profits, since 
0 > ∂ ∂ i i m π ; and this acts as a major entry deterrent.   
 
There are now three Results for the mobility case.   Results Five and Six together 
imply the following main result.  
 
Proposition Two:  The growth-maximizing level of union relative bargaining power 
is lower under ex post labour mobility,  * * A B ϖ ϖ < . 
  Proof:   If the growth-maximizing proportion of firms were the same in each 
case,  * * * λ λ λ = = B A , Result Six would then imply  ( ) *) ( * * * λ ϖ λ ϖ A B <  in 
order to compensate for the deterrent effect of labour mobility on firm entry. 
However, Result Five also shows that  B B A A G G λ λ ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  where  B A λ λ = , so 
that if  * A λ  maximizes growth  A G ,  then  * B λ , where  * * A B λ λ > , maximizes 
B G , which requires that  * B ϖ  is even lower than  * A ϖ  or that 
() *) ( * * * *) ( * A A A B B B λ ϖ λ ϖ λ ϖ < < . 
 
If the growth-maximizing proportion of firms were the same across cases, union 
bargaining power would need to be lower in the mobility case to compensate for the 
deterrent effect of mobility.   However, the growth maximizing proportions of firms is 
higher in the mobility case, so that the union bargaining power parameter is even 
lower.  
 
However, Results Four and Six together show that, because of conflicting effects, it is 
not possible to state definitively under which regime economic growth will be higher 
- for a given bargaining power parameter.   Although growth will be higher for a 
given proportion of firms [Result Four], it is also apparent that the latter must fall   24
[Result Six].  An additional Table with some numerical values is added to throw some 
light on this issue in comparison with Table One.   It implies the final, main result.    
 
Proposition Three:   If  0 > σ  , ex post labour mobility may bring about higher 
growth if union bargaining power is low,  but lower growth if it is high. 
 
The intuition for this result is that union bargaining power and ex post labour mobility 
are substitutes to the extent that they each reduce proportion of firms.  Consequently, 
even after accounting for some adjustment in the growth-maximizing proportion, 
either too much or too little of the two together where there is either powerful unions 
with highly mobile workers or weak unions with very immobile workers tends to be 
bad for growth.  
 
Finally, a comparison of Tables One and Two also provides numerical examples in 
support of Proposition Two.   If the ratio of the population standard deviation to the 
population mean is unity, economic growth is maximized where relative union 
bargaining power is 0.64 under immobility but 0.22 under mobility.  If this same ratio 
is extremely high, the respective figures are calculated at 0.69 to 0.005 where this 
ratio is extremely high.   Thus, strong unions are found to be beneficial for economic 
growth only where there are effective impediments to the mobility of labour.  The 
greater the degree of heterogeneity of firms’ total factor productivities, the stronger is 
this result.  
 
Table Two:  The effect of ex post labour mobility on the proportion of firms, 
economic growth and on the growth-maximizing and maximal levels (case B) 
 
   0 = σ ,  μ = e     μ σ = = e 3     0 = e ,  μ σ = 3  
ϖ     B λ   B G     B λ   B G     B λ   B G  
0.5    0.50       0.500X    0.24       0.721X    0.158        0.391X 
0.7    0.30     0.499X    0.17    0.676X    0.120        0.372X 




  60 . 0 *= B ϖ     22 . 0 *= B ϖ     005 . 0 *= B ϖ    25
maximal  
values  40 . 0 *= B λ  
X GB 51 . 0 *=  
345 . 0 *= B λ  
X GB 723 . 0 *=
33 . 0 *= B λ  
X GB 427 . 0 *=  
()
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6. Further  considerations 
 
6.1   The intermediate mobility case. 
It is, of course, implausible to assume that workers are all either perfectly mobile or 
immobile.  The consideration of an intermediate case would require the specification 
of mobility costs, which are neither so high that workers would never move nor so 
low that immobility is no longer a consideration.  Furthermore, if these costs vary 
across workers, some might readily switch between firms with small wage 
differences, while others might not even move at all from very low to very high wage 
firms.     A fully fledged model of an intermediate case, containing distributions both 
for entrepreneurial ability and for mobility, would necessarily entail considerable 
complexity.  A reasonable conjecture, however, is that any solution would be 
constitute some combination of the results for the two polar cases considered above.   
There should be distributions both for wages and for employment - with each, as well 
as investment, each being positively correlated with the ability of the entrepreneur.   
 
6.2  The wage firm-size relationship 
An intermediate case is of some interest, because it implies a positive relationship 
between the wage and the firm-size, a robust empirical finding.  [See, for example, 
Main and Reilly (1993).   Consequently, a generalization of this model would furnish 
a theoretical reason for an empirical relationship that has to some extent eluded   26
explanation, although Brown and Medoff (1989) provide some other possible 
reasons.
16   
 
6.3  Income equality and economic growth 
Proposition Three states that ex post labour mobility may bring about higher growth if 
union bargaining power is low, but lower growth if it is high.  A tighter wage 
distribution also emerges where labour is more mobile, so that, if the wage 
distribution adequately proxies the general income distribution, the case of relatively 
weak unions may explain the positive cross-country association between income 
equality and economic growth.  It should be noted that the income distribution here is 
not a causal factor for growth, for which various factors are considered in the survey 
by Aghion et al (1999).   The point here is that labour mobility increases allocative 
efficiency, while reducing wage inequality.   Furthermore, if unions are very strong, 
the present model also predicts the correlation would have a different sign. 
 
6.4  Where investment precedes the wage bargain  
Grout (1984) presented an alternative case of non-binding labour contracts where 
investment effectively precedes the wage bargain, because wages could always be 
renegotiated ex post.   In an OLG model related to the present one - except without an 
entrepreneurial class - Deveureux and Lockwood (1991) showed that the effect of 
non-binding contracts is to raise the rate of economic growth through an inter-
generational redistribution favouring young savers.  The effect of non-binding 
contracts is tantamount to unions having greater bargaining power, so that while their 
basic result would carry over into the present model, the growth effects would be 
modified either by enhancing or by offsetting effects with an endogenous number.   
Both inter- and intra-generational redistribution effects would be at play.  
 
Furthermore, the model may be played out over more than two stages, since 
investment may also precede the allocation of households to firms as well as the wage 
bargain.    Roberts (2009) considered this extension to show that heterogeneous firms 
may over-invest in order to signal their relative levels to prospective employees.   The 
                                                 
16 Another theoretical reason is provided by Green, Machin and Manning (1996).    27
possibility of over-investment by firms in a generally costly signalling game would 
discourage firms from entering, then suggesting, other things being equal, that 
economic activity would benefit from weaker labour unions.  Furthermore, investment 
could be higher when it precedes the wage bargain, in contrast with the standard 
result, because the signalling effect could even dominate that of the hold-up. 
 
6.5 Insider  unions 
The source of mobility costs has not been specified.   One possibility is that these are 
imposed by “insiders”, those who had allocated to firms at the initial stage.   Those 
who would, if they could, re-allocate later, may be designated the “outsiders”.  There 
is an incentive for insiders to exclude outsiders, because wages are decreasing in 
employment.   Snower and Lindbeck (2002) provide a summary of their body of 
work, giving reasons why insider-power might hold sway.  The insider-outsider 
interpretation is interesting, because the present model predicts that if unions are 
strong in one dimension, in being able to control entry, it may be beneficial in terms 
of economic growth for them to also be reasonably strong in the other dimension of 
wage bargaining power.   Although, insider-power is a possible explanation for the 
immobility case, the model does not depend on any particular cause, and the costs of 
geographical relocation are an obvious alternative among others.  
 
6.6   Political economy considerations  
Legislation addressed towards the labour market should affect the outcome of wage 
bargaining, of which the outlawing of the closed-shop in the UK in 1984 is a prime 
example.   Households may also determine economic outcomes through engaging in 
the political process, particularly, by voting in democratic elections.   The range of 
possibilities for political equilibria in the present context is far too wide to consider, 
because the model contains three types of household - with income distributions 
pertaining to each – as well as general equilibrium effects and non-monotonic 
relationships.   However, as an illustration, for the case of no labour mobility 
mobility, the old, having left the labour market, would have an incentive to vote for 
greater union power - and, so, in favour of the closed-shop, as this would reduce the 
proportion of firms and, thus, increase the interest return on their predetermined   28
saving, according to equation (13A).   This indicates the possibility of a possible 
voting coalition between workers and retirees, however, previously employed, but one 
which may not be sustained in the alternative scenario of very mobile labour 
 
6.7      Extending the model 
There are of course a number a ways in which the model could be extended.   The 
focus on wage bargaining has enabled us to regard relative income, as in Lucas 
(1978), as the driving factor for occupational choice and the number of firms.       
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) suggest that varying attitudes to risk may be a relevant 
criterion in an environment of uncertainty, while Evans and Jovanoviv (1989) point to 
the significance of initial wealth holdings where financial markets are imperfect.     
While these alternatives provide a richer way of modelling occupational choice, they 
should not overturn the basic effect of union bargaining power on this decision. 
 
An obvious extension would be to allow for unemployment.   Households would then 
weigh up the probability of periodic unemployment - certainly in the life-time of the 
worker and possibly in that of the potential entrepreneur too - when they come to 
make the initial allocation decision.  Another possibility might be to allow for self-
employment as a third option as a first resort and also as a consequence of 
unemployment.    
 
Furthermore, corporations could be considered alongside individual-owned 
enterprises as well as corporations, where the present assumption of decreasing 
returns to scale is relaxed in some way to accommodate this richer corporate 
landscape.   Individuals of high entrepreneurial ability might then face an additional 
occupational choice between being hired as a manager by others in a generally owned 
incorporation or and in ploughing their own furrow in a smaller but personal 
enterprise.        
 
Finally, there will be other deterrent effects on firm formation, affecting economic 
growth, besides the power of labour unions to bargain wages.  The relative taxation of 
wages and entrepreneurial profit would be a very close substitute to the parameter of   29
relative union bargaining power, and the model, as it stands, presents an economy that 
resides on something akin to a Laffer Curve.   It is straightforward to predict that 
profits should be taxed less aggressively, where inter-firm labour mobility is greater.  
 
8. Summary   
A model has been presented that integrates key labour market considerations, firm 
formation with economic growth.  The focus has been on the wage effect of unions on 
the entry of firms and, thence,  on aggregate activity levels and growth, because of a 
trade-off between deterring less able firms from entering and encouraging the entry of 
firms in general that operate under decreasing returns   The main results are that if 
labour is immobile, the best outcome may be in the interior, where reasonably strong 
unions confer macroeconomic benefits; while in the opposite case of high labour 
mobility, the presence of all but the strongest firms may be so discouraged that even a 
small degree of union power may be harmful with decreasing returns.    So, although 
the degree of labour union wage bargaining power has an uncertain effect on 
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